In this paper we shed light on the misallocation of resources between different productive sectors. We document that the distribution across sectors of both the public expenditure and the value added evolve together over time. We propose a general equilibrium model that interprets this evidence as a reduced form representation of two structural relations, namely, the dynamic effect of the public expenditure on the future distribution of value added and the influence of the distribution of vested interests across sectors on current public policy decisions. Since the shifts in the sectoral composition explain a relevant part of TFP growth, the model suggests that the political economy of public policy plays an important role in determining delays in the development path of an economy.
Introduction
sition. Public decisions may influence the sectoral evolution of an economy through taxation and public investment. Galor and Moav [13] and Galor, Moav, and Vollrath [14] for example model the transition to a different sectoral composition as driven by publicly provided education programs. At the same time, policies are usually tailored to or influenced by the productive structure of an economy. Hence, we combine in a growth model the endogenous determination of both the policy and the sectoral composition of an economy. Policies influence the future sectoral composition, the current sectoral composition drives the policies, and both contribute to the evolution of output over time.
In our framework the government distributes the public expenditure across sectors, and a voting process drives its actions. The public expenditure influences the economy's sectoral composition and therefore affects aggregate efficiency. The government can reallocate public expenditure across sectors, but by doing so it generates conflicts of interests among individuals working in different sectors. The voting process channels the political opposition to a possible reallocation. Hence, a government's proposal may be blocked and no change in the public expenditure will occur. Our model delivers the positive claim that a change towards sectoral specialization is more likely in economies with an already concentrated expenditure distribution. Let us provide the following illustrative example.
Example. Suppose two economies, A and B, that have two sectors each, 1 and 2. Suppose furthermore that the population distribution across sectors mirrors the value added distribution. Economy A's value added is composed 60% by Sector 1 and 40% by Sector 2. The policy of its government mirrors these relative magnitudes and distributes public expenditure 60% to Sector 1 and 40% to Sector 2. In Economy B instead the shares are 70% for Sector 1 and 30% for Sector 2, and the public expenditure is accordingly distributed. Both governments propose the same new public expenditure distribution, that is, 80% to Sector 1 and 20% to Sector 2. In both economies, the population in Sector 2 opposes the proposal because it would lose shares within government's budget if the proposal was approved. For the same logic, the population in Sector 1 supports the proposal. While in Economy A up to 40% of the population would oppose the proposal, in Economy B only 30% of the population would do so. Hence, Economy B is more likely to approve the proposal.
We can also invert the previous reasoning and claim that a change towards sectoral diversification is more likely in economies with an already diversified distribution. 3 In the example above, if the proposal were to distribute expenditure 50% − 50% between Sector 1 and 2, Economy A would be more likely to approve the proposal. This claim is supported by the data we analyze in the empirical motivation.
Our model allows only for growth-enhancing proposals, as it will become clearer in the following sections. Suppose for the moment that specialization is growth-enhancing. Then, diversified economies should grow less over time. Note though that public expenditure time-invariance should not be considered as a negative feature of diversified economies. In fact, more growth does not necessarily imply Pareto-improvement. In particular, redistributions of public expenditure imply that there are winners and losers in the voting process.
The set-up consists of a general equilibrium growth model of overlapping generations in the spirit of Galor, Moav, and Vollrath [14] . The government finances public expenditure through taxation. First, it finances sector-specific public investment with a flat tax on intergenerational savings. Second, it redistributes income across individuals with a flat tax on realized income and a system of sector-specific lump-sum transfers. The productive side of the economy consists of a continuum of sectors that contribute to the production of a unique final good. Sector-specific public investments influence sectorspecific human capital accumulation. Individuals live for two periods and have a single offspring. Each individual saves and selects the employment sector when young, and works in the chosen sector, votes, consumes, and leaves a bequest when old. Individual human capital accumulation depends on the level of sector-specific public investment devoted to the sector that individuals choose when young.
Each period the government makes a proposal for a new distribution that would reallocate the public expenditure, i.e., that would modify both public investment for the young and the system of lump-sum transfers for the old. Such a new distribution is chosen by making a random draw from the set of all possible growth-enhancing public expenditure distributions. Such a proposal would change the shares of each sector within the government budget. Moreover, the transfer that each individual working in a sector receives depends in equilibrium on the share that her sector holds within the government budget. Hence, individuals have a vested interest in increasing the share of the sector where they work. If the share is higher with the proposal, they will vote in its favor. Otherwise, they will vote against it.
If the majority of the population opposes the proposal, then there will be political blockage and the public expenditure distribution will remain the same as in the previous period. If the majority votes in favor of the proposal, the government will update the distribution to the proposed one.
The model yields three structural relations. First, the general equilibrium structure makes the population distribution among sectors mirror the public investment distribution. In other words, public expenditure drives the future sectoral -value added -composition of the economy. Second, aggregate efficiency depends on the distribution of public expenditure, because the higher the concentration, the more the population converges towards the highly productive sectors. Depending on how substitutable the sectors are in the production of the final good, productive specialization may be either a growth-enhancing or a growth-retarding policy, and an increase in the discrimination across sectors may shift the economy to either a higher or a lower development path. 4 Thus, the output is a function of previous period output and of previous period public expenditure distribution. Third, since the population is distributed across sectors according to previous period's public expenditure distribution, the likelihood of approval of a new distribution depends on the initial distribution. In particular, the more concentrated the public expenditure and consequently the population, the more likely is an even more concentrated proposal to be approved. Hence, this period's expenditure distribution is a function of the current value added distribution.
The three structural relations yield a reduced form prediction, i.e., that the output depends on the history of government proposals' successes and failures, whose probabilities depend on the value added distribution in the initial period. If the economy is stuck to an inferior development path characterized by a persistent political blockage of possibly growth-enhancing proposals, any exogenous shock that would modify the initial value added distribution could remove the political blockage and shift the economy to higher income levels. This refers, first, to economic crises, where mass unemployment rises unevenly across sectors. Second, to trade liberalizations and technological innovations, where for example new tradable goods change the combination of vested interests into organized political blockages. Third, to institutional changes such as the decentralization of political, administrative, and fiscal authority, where the subnational public decision units may face less sectoral complexity in the allocation of public resources, and the possibility of different political majorities across regions may remove the political blockages that occur at the national level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 interprets the empirical relevance of the model. Section 3 presents the set-up and the equilibrium solution. Section 4 analyzes the dynamics of the development process and their relation to the public expenditure distribution. Section 5 characterizes the political dynamics and the determinants of political blockages and approvals. Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 draws the final conclusions. Tables, figures, proofs, and simulation results are provided in the Appendix.
Empirical Motivation
In this section we provide an empirical intuition of the phenomena we deal with. We do not conduct a thorough empirical exercise since that would require a much more sophisticated model, from which we could infer some quantitative and not only qualitative properties. We leave such an exercise for future research. In the present work we simply present evidence about the qualitative correlations that we find in the data. We use data from Eurostat's government statistics (gov a) and national accounts (nama nace). In particular, we consider annual national data on general expenditure by function (COFOG), that decomposes total public expenditure into 10 categories, namely, general public services, defense, public order and safety, economic affairs, environmental protection, housing and community amenities, health, recreation, culture and religion, education, and social protection. Since in our model we consider public resources devoted to productive sectors, we focus empirically on public expenditure in economic affairs, which is itself decomposed into 9 sectors.
5 Eurostat provides data for 29 countries for different time periods, from the 1990's to 2008. We also consider annual accounts detailed breakdowns by branches (NACE), that decomposes gross value added into 7 sectors. 6 In this dataset there are 33 countries. We drop from both 5 The sectors are general economic, commercial, and labour affairs; agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; fuel and energy; mining, manufacturing and construction; transport; communication; other industries; research and development; and a residual category, economic affairs n.e.c. 6 We could choose finer decompositions such as 31 and 60 branches, but since the Gini coefficients we derive later seem sensible to the decomposition level, we choose the closest level to the 9 categories from the government statistics. The sectors are agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; total industry excluding manufacturing and construction; manufacturing; construction; wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods, hotels and restaurants, transport, storage and communication; financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities; pub-government expenditure and value added datasets the countries with excessive missing values, we intersect the two sets of countries, and eventually we are left with a balanced panel of 20 countries for 9 years, from 2000 to 2008. We provide the list of countries and some summary statistics on government expenditure in Table 1 in the Appendix. Table 1 contains the values of total general government expenditure in economic affairs as a percentage of GDP. This values are roughly stable through time and show quite a large crosscountry variation. The average expenditure in the whole sample is 4.6% of GDP, with no significant changes through time. For each country, we order the sectors increasingly according to their share in overall economic affairs expenditure in the first available period, which is 2000 for most countries. We correct only for some isolated negative values in the government expenditure due to disposals of non-financial non-produced assets. We then compute each country's public expenditure and value added cumulative distribution function for each year. As an example, Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict Germany's value added and government expenditure distributions in 2000 and 2008. Both value added and government expenditure distributions are more concentrated in 2008 than in 2000. In particular, 2008's distributions first-order lic administration and defense, compulsory social security, education, health and social work, other community, social and personal service activities, private households with employed persons. stochastically dominate 2000's. Increasing, and in some cases decreasing, first-order stochastic dominance is a common feature of the rest of countries in the sample, so using Gini coefficients seems to suit the observed distributional dynamics. 7 We compute the Gini coefficient of all distributions. We take the cross-sectional mean, we normalize its value to 2000's level, and we plot it over time in Figure 3 .
The value added distribution constantly increases its Gini coefficient over time, while the Gini of government expenditure fluctuates through time but increases from 2000 to 2008. Our model suggests an interpretation for these data. We claim that the joint evolution of value added and expenditure distributions is driven by two mechanisms. First, if the government expenditure gets more concentrated, so does the value added in the following period. Second, the value added distribution partially describes the relative political influence of each sector within the economy. Hence, the government expenditure distribution in each period tends to mirror the value added distribution in the same period. As we mentioned in the Introduction, the model suggests a system of three structural relations. We focus here on the two simultaneous and autonomous equations where the endogenous variables are the value 7 We cannot analyze sector-specific pairwise correlations because the sectors in which Eurostat classifies value added and government expenditure do not coincide. This is why we are forced to employ a synthetic measure such as the Gini coefficient. added and government expenditure Gini coefficients, that is,
where VA t is the value added Gini coefficient in period t, GE t is the government expenditure Gini coefficient in period t, and f t and g t are possibly non-linear equations that contain exogenous variables and error terms. Let us see now these relations look like in the data for, e.g., Germany and Italy. Figure 4 represents the first equation of (1), and Figure 5 represents the second equation. The lines in Figure 4 and in Figure 5 represent the predicted values of linear regressions. We choose two specific countries for the clarity of exposition. With respect to our sample of European Countries, Germany and Italy have a comparable level of development, geographical extension, and institutional framework, in the sense that they were part of the European Union for the whole time period. This is important because there seems to be a relevant cross-country dispersion due to the exogenous variables of (1), as we show later. In the case of Germany and Italy the relations of (1) seem to be positive. The same relations for the whole pool of countries are reported in Figures 17 and 18 in the Appendix. There seems to be a high cross-country dispersion in levels, but the relations seem to be similar across countries. The value added and government expenditure distributions tend to move in the same direction, either towards concentration or towards diversification. My model interprets the distinction between these two sets of countries as the difference in the complementarity among sectors. If the productive sectors of a country are complementary, in the sense that the shocks to sector-specific value added are correlated over time, then the country tends to diversify its production among different sectors, that is, the growth rate of the Gini coefficients of public expenditure is on average negative. If instead the productive sectors are substitutable, the growth rate is on average positive. Figure 6 shows this relation for our pool of countries. If we were to run a simple cross-sectional regression, we would obtain a negatively-sloped line, whose inclination would considerably increase if we dropped Hungary or Estonia from the sample. We compute complementarity by considering Eurostat quarterly data on sector-specific value added (namq nace) for each country. If two sectors produce intermediate goods that are complementary for the production of the final good, then a shock to one sector should be correlated with a shock to the other one. Hence, we derive the sector-specific growth rates and we compute their correlations over time. The correlations are almost always nonnegative, and not statistically significant when negative. We then take the average of the correlations among sectors, so as to obtain a measure of the average complementarity that lies between 0 and 1. We can note considerable cross-country differences. 9 This might seem at odds with the characterization of complementarity as an aspect of the production technology. Nevertheless, that characterization refers to closed economies where each productive sector is represented, which is not the case for our sample of European countries. If we were to compute the same complementarity measure for a roughly closed economy such as the European Union as a whole we would find a much higher level of complementarity, as shocks to one sector would not transmit to other sectors outside the economy's borders, but would rather feed across the sectors in the economy.
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Let us look at Germany's and Italy's Gini coefficients through time in Figure 7 and Figure 8 . From 2000 to 2008, Germany's expenditure and value added Gini coefficients increase by 3.3% and 3.8%. Italy's coefficients increase by 7.6% and 5.0%.
11 Germany's expenditure is more stable than Italy's, while value 9 Consider that we drop Austria from the graph because it shows an extremely low complementarity and its inclusion would change the scale of the axes.
10 For a discussion of sectoral complementarity as the source of aggregate fluctuations and comovement, see Long and Plosser [19] and [20] , Horvath [16] and [17] , Dupor [10] , Carvalho [5] , Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi [2] , Carvalho and Gabaix [6] . 11 The spike in 2006 for Italy is probably due to an electoral-year bias. added seems to follow a similar pattern. Hence, even in this two-country example we find cross-sectional differences in government expenditure due to country-specific characteristics, but a similar relation between value added and expenditure within each country. In particular, the more concentrated is the value added distribution, the more concentrated tends to be the expenditure distribution. There is also a high autocorrelation of both government expenditure and value added. In fact, given (1) we can obtain both the reduced form for VA t ,
and the reduced form for GE t ,
since both expressions express respectively VA t and GE t as a function of all the exogenous variables and orthogonal error terms. 12 Hence, the reduced form of our model suggests a law of motion for both the value added and the government expenditure distributions. We represent evidence of these laws of motion for our pool of countries in Figure 9 and in Figure 10 . 12 More precisely, the correct reduced form would express the value added and the government expenditure at each period t as the t-th iteration of the composed functions above. 13 In Figure 9 we drop Bulgaria and Luxembourg as outliers. They would simply increase the scale of the graph. We assign a color to each country and we plot its observations through time with the same color. There is a wide cross-country dispersion, which means that there must be country-specific characteristics driving the -levels of -Gini coefficients of both government expenditure and value added. In other words, the role of the exogenous variables is relevant. A thorough empirical exercise would consist of finding the exogenous variables of f t and g t in (1) . Some examples would be the level of development, the geographical extension, and the institutional framework. These three variables are important determinants of the Gini coefficients of government expenditure and value added, as the following stylized facts suggest. First, more developed countries seem to be more sectorally diversified. Second, since industrial sectors tend to cluster geographically, the smaller the country, the more concentrated the value added distribution. Third, if a country commits to certain structural reforms, like the Eastern European countries that accessed the European Union in 2004, this affects their government expenditure distribution independently from their value added distribution. With respect to these exogenous variables, Germany and Italy seem reasonably similar compared to the other countries in our sample.
The Model
Consider an economy where a firm produces a unique final good according to a Cobb-Douglas production function,
where K t ∈ R + is the stock of physical capital at time t and H t ∈ R + parameterizes the aggregate level of human capital. The shares of these two components are described by the constant α ∈ (0, 1). The human capital at the aggregate level is a combination of a continuous variety of sectoral specializations, each of them representing a different type of sectoral expertise. Therefore aggregate human capital is an additively separable sum of a continuum of mass J of sector-specific levels of human capital, that is,
where j indexes the generic sector in the interval [0, J] ⊂ R + , and H t (j) ∈ R + indicates the sector-specific human capital. The firm operates under perfect competition. Since there is a unique final good, we can normalize its price to 1. The maximization problem for the final good firm at time t is
where w t (j) ∈ R + is the wage per efficiency unit in sector j and R t ∈ R + is the rate of return on capital. The first order condition (FOC) with respect to the physical capital is
while the FOC with respect to the j-th sector-specific human capital
From the FOC we can recover the optimal shares of physical and human capital within the final output, i.e.,
The accumulation of physical capital is driven by private investment under full depreciation, i.e.,
There is a continuum of individuals of mass 1, each of them indexed by i. Each individual lives for two periods, t and t + 1, and at the beginning of the second she has a single child, so that every period a constant cohort of individuals of mass 1 is born. Every individual selects the sector where to work in the first period, and works, votes, consumes and leaves a bequest in the second period. The timing in period t unfolds as follows:
1. the individual receives an after-tax bequest from her parent,
where b i t (j ′ ) ∈ R + is the bequest given the sector j ′ where the parent worked and τ A t is the tax rate on bequests, 2. she saves inelastically all her financial endowment and lends it to the firm, 3. she observes how total public investment A t = J 0 a t (j)dj is allocated across sectors according to the distribution F t , 4. she selects the sector j that guarantees her the highest wage income in period t + 1. Once she chooses the sector, she receives from the government the right to access the sector-specific public investment a t (j).
14 In period t + 1, the individual realizes income.
1. She accumulates human capital h t+1 (j) that depends on the public investment directed to the sector she chose in the previous period, i.e., h t+1 (j) ≡ h(a t (j)). 15 We assume decreasing individual returns to scale on public investment, i.e., the function h is homogeneous of degree ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
2. She supplies inelastically one unit of labor in the sector she has chosen and receives an interest on her savings. Hence, her realized income is the sum of wage and capital income, i.e.,
The realized income is taxed by the government at rate τ E t . After being taxed, an individual working in sector j is supposed to receive a lump-sum transfer ξ t+1 (j) from the government. Hence, she votes in the following way:
3. she observes a proposal presented by the government. This proposal consists of an alternative public expenditure distribution,F t+1 ,
she votes in favor of the proposal if and only if
, if the transfer she would get is higher with the proposed distribution than with the old one. Otherwise, she votes against it.
The individual final income is
where for simplicity we avoid to report the dependence of an individual's income on the sector where her parent worked, j ′ . The preferences of individual i born at time t and working in sector j in t + 1 are represented by a log-linear utility function,
, where β ∈ (0, 1) indicates the preference share of bequests, c i t+1 ∈ R + is second period's consumption and b i t+1 ∈ R + is the transfer to the offspring due to a joy-of-giving bequest motive. 16 The optimal choice of how much to 15 We rule out any congestion effect by considering public investment in a sector-specific pure public good. This simplification defines the distinction from the opposite case of complete congestion, where the equilibrium population distribution would be independent of the public expenditure distribution. 16 We choose a warm-glow-of-giving type of utility function merely for analytical simplicity. Allowing for an alternative bequest motive such as in Alonso-Carrera, Caballé, and Raurich [3] , that is, a vested interest in the amount of after-tax bequest that the offspring eventually receives, would not change qualitatively the optimal choice of bequest and consumption.
consume and how much to leave as a bequest for member i of generation t in period t + 1 is then the solution to the following problem,
where I i t+1 (j) is defined in (8) . The first order conditions yield
Note again that the optimal choices and total income should be indexed also by j ′ , as the parental bequest b t (j ′ ) is a state variable of the problem. We neglect this element because it does not affect the aggregate dynamics of the model, although it does indeed drive the evolution of a dynasty's income through time. Moreover, note that the indirect utility function,
is a monotonically increasing function of final income, which depends positively on the lump-sum transfer devoted to sector j. This is the vested interest that drives the individual's voting behavior, that is, voting yes to the proposalF t+1 if and only if ξ t+1 (j)|F t+1 ≥ ξ t+1 (j)| Ft .
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The government follows two balanced-budget constraints. It finances public investment A t by taxing bequests, i.e.,
and finances aggregate lump-sum transfers E t by taxing realized income, i.e.,
We could consider more sophisticated forms of taxation, but since the focus of our paper is on the public expenditure distribution we can neglect the distortions introduced by bequest taxation, which for our purposes are not qualitatively different from a labor, income, or savings tax. This indifference is mainly due to the inelastic labor supply assumed above. We do not 17 We stress the timing of the individuals because the results below are sensible to it. In particular, if we put the voting decision in the first period and the sector selection in the second, on the one hand, individuals would not have a vested interest in voting in favor of a sector, as ex-ante they would not belong to any. On the other hand, individuals' final income would depend on aggregate efficiency, so they would vote in favor of efficiency-increasing public expenditure distribution proposals. There would be no conflict of interests and efficiency dynamics would be entirely driven by government proposals.
consider lump-sum taxation because we want to keep the trade-off between private investment in physical capital and public investment in human capital. 18 Moreover, the government imposes a tax rate τ E t on realized income and it redistributes the revenue E t through lump-sum transfers. The proportional tax rate τ E t does not introduce any distortion in the dynamics of the economy because the imposition occurs when the individual has already realized her income. We can think of A t as the investment in public education or infrastructures, and E t as a system of transfers for redistributive purposes.
The public resources available at any period, A t and E t , are distributed across sectors according to the public expenditure distribution F t . Thus, each sector j receives the sector-specific public investment a t (j) ∈ [0, A t ] and the sector-specific transfer e t (j) ∈ [0, E t ] according to F t . Note that by construction
The functions a t and e t map each sector j in [0, J] to levels of sector-specific public investment a t (j) and transfer e t (j). Let us defineã t (j) ≡ a t (j)/A t andẽ t ≡ e t (j)/E t . By construction,ã t (j) =ẽ t (j) for every j in [0, J], since the public expenditure distribution across sectors F t affects all types of public expenditure. Therefore, from now on we refer toã t (j) bearing in mind that it coincides with the distribution of overall public expenditure across sectors. We can viewã t as a density function over the support set [0, J], sinceã t (j) ≥ 0 for every j and
t (s)ds as the cumulative distribution function of public expenditure over the sectors' interval. Hence, F t definesã t (j) and A t (j) for every j in [0, J].
The public expenditure distribution evolves over time. Every period t + 1, the government formulates a proposal,F t+1 . If the individuals' voting outcome approves the proposal, then the government updates the distribution according to F t+1 =F t+1 . Otherwise, the government ignores the proposal and sets F t+1 = F t . The government formulates the proposal by making a random draw from the set of all possible public expenditure distributions which would increase next period's output, that is,
In our model, the government does not coincide with a central planner. It does not maximize any welfare function, it simply follows every period the constitutional rule described above. Its decisions are simply the result of the chance in the draws ofF t+1 every period and individuals' voting outcomes. In a sense, it is not an agent of our economy, but rather an aspect of the model's technology. The connections between the different sides of this economy consist of, first, the savings-investment market equilibrium condition,
where the right hand side is the sum of all after-tax bequests saved by individuals in the first period of life. Second, we consider the aggregation rule for sector-specific human capital,
where θ t (j) ∈ [0, 1] is the portion of total population working in sector j at time t. Since the mass of the population is 1,
represents therefore the population density in sector j at time t. Note that H t (j) parameterizes the aggregate demand for sector j-specific efficiency units expressed by the firm. In equilibrium this must be equal to the total supply, which is the individual supply h t (j) of efficiency units of those who chose sector j multiplied by the total number θ(j) of individuals in sector j. Third, the transfer received by sector j is equally distributed among the population working in sector j, i.e., e t (j) = ξ t (j)θ t (j),
for every j in [0, J]. Fourth, the workers select the sector according to the wage income that working in that sector guarantees. In equilibrium this implies that the wage income must be the same across sectors, that is to say,
for all j ∈ [0, J]. If this was not true, at the moment of choosing the sector any individual would have the incentive to choose the higher wage income sector, increasing the supply in that sector and lowering thereafter its wage per efficiency unit. Finally, we impose a political threshold for successful proposals, namely that proposals are approved if and only if the majority of the population expresses a vote in their favor.
Assumption 1 (Approval Threshold). A proposalF t+1 is approved if the mass of individuals in favor is greater or equal than 1/2.
The existence of an approval threshold is a salient element of the results below, but the level of such a threshold is qualitatively irrelevant. We choose majority voting for simplicity and consistency with widespread concepts in the literature such as median voters and Condorcet winners.
We define and solve for the intertemporal equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1 (Intertemporal Equilibrium
). An intertemporal equilibrium is a set of firm decisions {K t } t∈[0,∞) and ] for every t ∈ [0, ∞),
is a solution to problem (9) given (8), for all i ∈ [0, 1] and all t ∈ [0, ∞), Suppose that we order the sectors increasingly according to their sectorspecific public investment, a t (j). In what follows, we make an assumption in order to obtain an analytically tractable framework. This assumption though is not necessary for the derivation of the equilibrium solution.
Assumption 2. The function a t is differentiable and strictly increasing on (0, J) for every t.
The rationale behind this assumption is that sectors in our model are different between each other only in terms of the public expenditure directed to them. There is no other intrinsic technological endowment that characterizes each sector. Hence, the sector-specific public investment differs between any pair of sectors j and k, that is, a t (j) = a t (k). Assumption 2 implies that the function a t is continuous and by construction that a ′ t > 0. Consequently, alsoã t is differentiable and strictly increasing. Thus, there exists an inverse functionã −1 t such that, for any j ∈ [0, J],ã −1 t (ã t (j)) = j. If we call x ≡ã t (j) and its distribution F t (x), the latter is the same as the distribution of j, i.e., F t (ã t (j)) = A t (j). We can combine the first order conditions of the different agents and the market clearing conditions in order to summarize the equilibrium solution in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (The Equilibrium Solution). Given the tax rate τ A t , total output evolves over time depending on the public expenditure distribution F t , i.e.,
where
Moreover, the distribution of population across sectors at time t + 1 mirrors the public expenditure distribution decided at time t, that is,
and the transfer that each individual working in sector j receives is a linear function of the share of that sector within the government budget, that is,
See Appendix A for the proofs of all propositions.
The Development Process
We show how the public expenditure distribution affects aggregate human capital and therefore the law of motion of total output. The equilibrium law of motion, (17) , expresses future output Y t+1 as a function of the public expenditure distribution F t and current output level Y t . Suppose we fix the distribution to its initial level, i.e., F t = F 0 for every t. Furthermore, we also fix the exogenously given tax rate on bequests to its initial level, τ
The law of motion ψ t is in this case time invariant, that is, Y t+1 = ψ(Y t |F 0 ) for every t. In other words, we neglect for the moment that F t is a product of the voting equilibrium in every period. Thus, there is only one endogenous state variable, namely the current level of output Y t . Then we have that
In order to analyze how output evolves over time maintaining constant the other variables, we state the following proposition. 
that is, the law of motion is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and respects the Inada conditions.
This proposition assures that the law of motion is well behaved and that the economy is able to follow a development process independently of the public expenditures distribution. In particular, let us define a steady state. Proposition 2 implies that, if there exists a non-trivial steady state Y s > 0, it is unique and identified by the public expenditure distribution, F 0 . In order to obtain a closed form solution for it, we set
which yields a unique solution greater than 0,
The steady state level of total output depends on F 0 . This unique non-trivial steady state is also stable, because the condition under which Y t+1 > Y t is
which corresponds to the condition Y t < Y s . Hence, given the law of motion with the properties defined in Proposition 2, there exists a unique nontrivial steady state which is stable and whose level depends on the public expenditure distribution. If the public expenditure distribution is constant, the economy follows a standard development path towards a unique stable steady state, as Figure 11 shows.
Figure 11: Development Path with a Constant Distribution
There exists a multiplicity of steady states, each one identified by a different public expenditure distribution. It is then crucial to understand the effect of changes in the public expenditure distribution on the development path. In order to do so, we have to choose how to sort different distributions and see if there is a relation between this sorting and different development paths. In what follows, we choose to classify distributions according to their degree of first-order stochastic dominance, as this delivers the most clear-cut results and it directly connects with the use of Gini coefficients in Section 2. It is possible to obtain also results for second-order stochastic dominance, but the necessary restrictions on the parameter space are even stronger. The element φ(F t ) in the law of motion for total output, which depends on the public expenditure distribution, can be expressed as
where g(x) ≡ x ǫ(1−α) α −1 . Let us now state the following assumptions.
Assumption 3. The function g is nondecreasing.
Assumption 4. The function g is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Given that g(x) ≡ x ǫ(1−α) α −1 , the conditions in Assumptions 3 and 4 imply respectively that ǫ(1 − α) ≥ α and α < ǫ(1 − α) < 2α. These are the restrictions on the parameter space that permit us to link the ordering of the public expenditure distributions by first-order stochastic dominance with different development paths. As a preliminary discussion about the plausibility of these assumptions, let us remember that the parameter α measures the share of physical capital in the production function. If we take the standard value of 0.3 for α, and therefore (1−α) = 0.7, then g is nondecreasing for values of the homogeneity degree ǫ of the human capital accumulation function close to 1. This means that the returns of public investment on human capital must be not too decreasing for Assumptions 3 and 4 to hold. Moreover, Assumption 4 holds only if α is not excessively small. Let us remember that a distributionF t first-order stochastically dominates (henceforth, dominates) the distribution F t whenF t (x) ≤ F t (x) for every x ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover,F t strictly dominates F t when there exist a < b in (0, 1) such that
for any other value of x. We call the shift from F t toF t an increase in dominance. Such an increase means intuitively that sectors with high portions of overall public expenditure increase their shares, and sectors with low portions decrease them. Note that this implies an increase in the mean and variance of the public expenditure distribution.
Proposition 3 (Efficiency with Dominance). If Assumption 3 holds andF t dominates F t , then, φ(F t ) ≥ φ(F t ). If Assumption 4 holds andF t strictly dominates F t , then φ(F t ) > φ(F t ).
This proposition suggests specialization as a channel of productive efficiency. The origin of the increase in aggregate productivity is the concentration of the population in the most efficient sectors. The population equilibrium distribution, (18) , mirrors the public investment distribution across sectors. Hence, an increase in dominance causes a corresponding increase in the population distribution dominance. Since θ t+1 (j) is strictly increasing inã t (j), if the latter increases, then the former increases as well. Hence, population migrates from low-productive and less-populated sectors to highproductive and more-populated sectors. The concentration occurs because the public investment in a sector is a pure public good for the individuals that choose that sector. This creates the possibility of aggregate positive returns on concentration. An increase in dominance causes, on the one hand, an increase in individual productivity and in the number of workers in a few sectors and, on the other hand, a decrease in productivity and in the number of workers in all the other sectors. If the parameter restrictions implied by Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, the former effect overcome the latter for any degree of concentration, paving the way for persistent positive returns. Thus, the plausibility of the parameter restrictions implied by these assumptions is key to Proposition 3. The parameter α plays a specific role in the production function, namely in (2) and (3), since if α is equal to 0 the sectors are perfectly substitutable, while if α tends to 1 we approach perfect complementarity. Then, Assumptions 3 and 4 imply that aggregate improvement through sectoral specialization is possible only if the sectors are sufficiently substitutable for the production of the final good. Indeed, if the sectors are enough complementary to reverse Assumptions 3 and 4, Proposition 3 is also reversed and sectoral diversification leads to aggregate efficiency. Hence, Assumptions 3 and 4 help in defining a perspective of analysis. If they hold, specialization leads to aggregate efficiency. If they do not hold, diversification is the efficient policy. In the data we may find an unclear correlation between specialization and economic growth across countries. Our model interprets this ambiguous relation as the occurrence, cross-country and over time, of Assumptions 3 and 4.
19 The main message of Proposition 3 is that, although there are no aggregate increasing returns of the amount A t of public investment, there may be a limited scope for efficiency gains from the direction of such an investment.
An increase in dominance causes an increase in future output and therefore a generalized increase in future wage income, because W t+1 = (1−α)Y t+1 . Note though that this is not necessarily a Pareto-improvement. As (19) states, transfers decrease for individuals who work in sectors that lose shares in the overall public expenditure. This has also a repercussion on the bequest that these individuals leave to their offspring, and therefore on the disposable income of part of the future generation. Hence, an increase in dominance in period t increases overall income in period t + 1, but it also prejudices the current income of some individuals and consequently of their offspring. In other words, it generates income redistributions through time.
Proposition 3 states that the function φ in the law of motion for output (17) depends negatively on F t , namely that the more dominant the initial public expenditure distribution the higher the aggregate efficiency. This has consequences on the development path that an economy follows depending on the initial distribution, as the next proposition clarifies.
Proposition 4 (Initial Distribution and Development). Suppose Assumption
19 Figure 6 reports an index of sectoral complementarity in the horizontal axis. A direct implication of this proposition is that, if at a certain stage of the development process the dominance degree changes, the economy shifts to a development path that would have been unreachable with the original distribution. This effect is common to any level of income Y t and to any initial distribution F 0 , as we can see in Figure 12 . Thus, the more regressive the redistributions across sectors along the development process are, the higher the development path is.
holds. IfF
The effect of changes in the exogenous variables τ A t and β on the steady state and on the transition path are not the focus of this paper. Nevertheless, we can show that there exists an interior tax rate τ * = ǫ(1−α)/(α+ǫ(1−α)) ∈ (0, 1) above which increases in the tax rate τ have negative effects on future output and below which the effects are positive. Therefore, there exists an optimal tax rate that assures the highest transition path and the highest steady state. The share of bequests within individuals' incomes, β, fastens the development path, though the returns of β on M(τ A t ) are decreasing. Since in our model bequests act as intergenerational savings, this is consistent with the standard development dependence on the saving rate.
Political Opposition and Blockages
Each period the government makes a random draw from the set of all possible distributions that would increase efficiency and proposes such a distribution to the population. According to Assumption 3 and Proposition 3, the set from which the government makes its draws is
i.e., the set of the distributions which dominate F t . If Assumption 3 did not hold, the set would be
We restrict ourselves to the case where Assumption 3 does hold, although all the following results hold under the alternative assumption with the adequate sign inversions. The population observes the proposal and decides whether to approve it. The proposal is approved if the majority of the population is in favor, as Assumption 1 states. In case the proposalF t+1 passes the voting test in period t + 1, the government sets the public expenditure distribution to F t+1 =F t+1 . The individual expresses her vote on the proposal in her second period of life, depending on whether ξ t+1 (j)|F t+1 ≥ ξ t+1 (j)| Ft . If this condition holds, the individual votes in favor of the proposal. Otherwise, she votes against it. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Opposition to Proposals). An individual in sector j votes against a proposal if and only ifã
In other words, if the share of the sector where the individual works would decrease with the proposal, she votes against it because the transfer that she would get in case the proposal was approved is lower than the transfer she would get if the public expenditure distribution remained the same. Given a sector j such thatã t+1 (j) ≥ã t (j) ifF t+1 was approved, all the individuals who work in that sector in t + 1 vote in favor of the proposal. Hence, the number of "yes" votes coming from sector j in period t + 1 for the proposed proposalF t+1 is θ t+1 (j), which is a function ofã t (j) and F t according to (18) . Let us consider the equilibrium population distribution as described by its cumulative distribution function, that is,
The sectors are ordered increasingly according to their share in government's budget andF t+1 represents an increase in the dominance. Thus, ifã t+1 (j) < a t (j), then for every sector k such thatã t (k) ≤ã t (j), that is, for every sector k such that k < j,ã t+1 (k) <ã t (k) as well. An increase in dominance implies that, if a sector loses shares with a proposal, every sector that is currently entitled with a lower share loses shares as well. So, Θ t+1 (j) expresses the amount of population who would vote "no" to the proposal up to sector j.
The following key concept helps to compute the total amount of population that opposes the proposal.
Definition 3 (Neutral Sector). A neutral sector j n 's share within government's budget would not change with the proposalF t+1 . In other words,
Since the share in government's budget would remain the same under the proposal, the individuals that work in the neutral sector are indifferent between the proposal and the current distribution, in the sense that the transfer they receive is the same under both distributions. We state the following assumption to ensure the existence of at least one neutral sector.
Assumption 5. The function a t satisfies lim j→0 a t (j) = 0 for every t.
We want to rule out the possibility of proposing redistributions of public investment from the single sector with the lowest share to the others. Redistributions in this way affect a strictly positive mass of sectors.
Proposition 6 (Existence of the Neutral Sector). Suppose Assumptions 2 and 5 hold. If a proposalF t+1 strictly dominates the initial distribution F t , there exists a neutral sector, j
n .
We can consider a particular case of growth-enhancing proposal, namely such that, if F t+1 =F t+1 , A ′′ t+1 (j) > A ′′ t (j) for every j in (0, J), where A t+1 is the public expenditure cumulative distribution function at time t + 1. The intuition behind this case is that, given a sector j, the sectors that have slightly higher shares in government's budget than j's would increase the distance of their shares from j's. In other words,ã ′ t+1 (j) >ã ′ t (j). In this case, the neutral sector is unique. n . Moreover, for every j < j n we havẽ a(j) t+1 <ã t (j) and for every j > j n we haveã t+1 (j) >ã t (j).
An individual in a sector j < j n expresses her vote against the proposal, because the share of her sector would decrease with the proposed distribution and this would have negative effects on her transfer. Instead, all the individuals that work in a sector j > j n vote in favor of the proposal. Hence, the amount of negative votes is Θ t+1 (j n ), and the amount of positive votes is 1 − Θ t+1 (j n ). Since the threshold for approval of a proposal is given by Assumption 1, we can state in the following proposition. According to this proposition and to Proposition 3, sinceF t+1 would exhibit a higher dominance than F t , the consequence of a blockage in period t + 1 is a lower dominance in t + 1 and therefore a lower level of total output in t + 2. If the government made the proposal only in period t + 1 and not in every period, this would mean that the economy would be bound to an inferior development path from period t + 1 onward, as Proposition 4 states.
Proposition 8 (Political Blockage and Approval). Suppose there exists a unique neutral sector. Then
, if 1 − Θ t+1 (j n ) > 1/2, the government sets F t+1 =F t+1 . If Θ t+1 (j n ) ≥ 1/2, there
is a blockage and the government sets
We now turn to the probability of political blockage, namely that Θ t+1 (j n ) ≥ 1/2. This probability depends on two elements, the endogenous state F t and the exogenous random componentF t+1 , which interacting with F t generates the neutral sector j n .
Claim (Likelihood of a Political Blockage). The probability of political blockage in period t + 1 decreases with the dominance degree of F t .
There are four classes of results for this claim. First, let us consider a certainF t+1 and a fixed j n . Suppose that an alternative initial distribution F t generates the same j n in combination withF t+1 and at the same time dominates F t . Then, Θ t+1 (j n ) would be lower, which implies it would be more likely for Θ t+1 (j n ) to stand below the 1/2 blockage threshold. Hence, an increase in the initial dominance that maintains the same j n increases the probability that the same proposalF t+1 is approved.
Second, let us formalize the concept of change degree.
Definition 4 (Change Degree). The change degree δ associated to a given initial distribution F t and a proposalF t+1 is defined as
that is, the change degree is the maximal distance between the initial A t and A t+1 if F t+1 =F t+1 .
By (22) , Definition 3, and Proposition 7, we have that
The change degree is the cumulated distribution shift of the neutral sector between the initial and the proposed distribution. Then, every proposed change from anF t to anF t+1 that exhibits the same j n as a change from F t andF t+1 , whereF t dominates F t andF t+1 dominatesF t+1 , is more likely to be approved than the change from F t toF t+1 . This is true for all δ's within the class of proposals that generate the same j n . Hence, a higher initial dominance increases the possibility of approval of all proposals that generate the same j n . Third, the subset of proposals that are approved for sure depends on the initial distribution. Let us define another important sector in the political equilibrium.
Definition 5 (Approval Sector). An approval sector j a is defined by the condition Θ t (j a ) = 1/2. In other words, the approval sector measures the span of sectors whose population would be sufficient to approve a proposal.
If the neutral sector j n is lower in ranking than the approval sector j a , that is, if j n ≤ j a , then the proposal generating such a neutral sector is approved, since in this case Θ t (j n ) ≤ Θ t (j a ) = 1/2. Hence, the condition j n ≤ j a is sufficient for the approval. If we increase the dominance degree of the initial distribution the ranking of j a increases, so the span of sectors that might result as a successful neutral sector of a proposal increases with the dominance degree of the initial distribution. If each sector had the same probability of resulting as the neutral sector generated by the randomly drawn proposal, then the probability of j n ≤ j a would increase with the dominance degree of the initial distribution.
Fourth, the claim that the probability of blockage at t decreases with the degree of dominance at t cannot be generalized explicitly outside stylized cases such as a fixed j n or a uniform distribution of the event j = j n on [0, J]. We explore therefore the case of a variable j n by simulating the possible outcomes. Up to now we considered a continuous variety of sectors. This permitted us to obtain a series of neat propositions. However, the qualitative results would still hold if we dropped the continuity assumption. We consider therefore a discrete number of sectors, namely J = 1000. Given an initial randomly assigned F t , we consider a reallocation algorithm that increases the dominance according to a given j n and a given proxy for the change degreeδ. The algorithm consists of taking a portionδ, which we call proposed change degree, of the mass of public expenditure assigned to all the sectors that have a lower share thanã t (j n ), and transfer it to the sectors that have a higher share thanã t (j n ). In other words, we transfer an amountδA t (j n ) of public expenditure. The reallocation within each subset of the support set {1, ..., J}, namely within {1, ..., j n − 1} and within {j n + 1, ..., J}, is made equally. In other words, the total transfer is divided by the number of sectors within each subset and equally distributed. The results are robust to other within-subset reallocations, e.g., a proportional, regressive, or progressive one. We repeat this reallocation considering as neutral one every 10 sectors on the support set, that is, we consider 100 possible neutral sectors. For each neutral sector we consider 9 different change degrees, that is,δ can take values {0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9}. Thus, for a given initial F t we obtain 100 possible proposals that could originate from it, as Figure 14 in Appendix B shows. Each graph corresponds to a different change degree, and for eachδ we represent the 100 possible proposals, each one corresponding to a different j n ∈ {1, ..., J}. We have then a span of possible proposals for eachδ, from which we can extract the mean and median values. The mean though seems to overestimate the likelihood of a blockage, while the median seems to underestimate it. In fact, if we trim the simulated data by eliminating the lowest and highest 10% of each span, that is, if we eliminate the proposals whose neutral sectors are at the boundaries of the support set, we obtain a result for the mean value that is intermediate between the pure mean and median cases. This means that the cumulative distribution functions computed for the extreme values of j n are outliers in our sample, so they may bias the likelihood of a blockage. We therefore take into account the trimmed-down dataset, as Figure 15 shows. By increasing the change degree, the neutral sector shifts towards higher ranks of the sequence {1, ..., J}, up to the point where the proposals are likely to be blocked. We then compute an alternative initial distributionF t that first-order stochastically dominates the previous one, that is, we simulate a higher initial dominance. This alternative initial distribution is obtained by reallocating the initial distribution aroundĵ = J/2. The reallocation consists of the transfer of 10% of total public expenditures from all the sectors j <ĵ to all the sectors j > j n . The following results are consistent for values ofĵ in a trimmed subset of sectors, that is, excluding the highest and lowest 10% of {1, ..., J}, and any change degree of the reallocation in {0.1, ..., 0.9}. We compute again all the possible proposals starting from the alternative initial distribution. We trim the data by eliminating the lowest and highest 10%, and we compute the mean cumulative distribution function of the proposals. To show how the likelihood of a blockage decreases as we increase the initial dominance, we compare the cumulative distribution function computed at j n before and after the shift in the initial dominance, that is, Θ t (j n ) andΘ t (j n ). We repeat this for every change degree. In Figure 16 we can see both how the blockage likelihood increases as the change degree increases, and how a higher initial dominance generates a lower likelihood for any change degree. This simulation exercise supports the claim that blockage probability in period t + 1 decreases with F t 's dominance degree.
Discussion
An economy exhibits a certain sectoral composition F t+1 at a certain period t + 1 with a probability that depends on previous period's public expenditure distribution F t . This can be iterated up to the initial distribution F −1 , which is the endowment of an economy together with b i 0 > 0 for some i. Given a certain infinite stream of per-period growth-enhancing proposals, {F t } ∞ t=0 , the probability that an economy reaches a certain sectoral composition F , i.e., that an economy settles in a certain development path described by Y t+1 = ψ(Y t |F ) and therefore by Y s = Y s (F ), is higher if F −1 shows a higher dominance degree. Since the time horizon is infinite, two economies with different initial distributions differ only in the timing in which they reach the development path described by Y t+1 = ψ(Y t |F ). In case of only growth-enhancing distribution changes, there exists a unique steady state to which all economies with the same parameter values tend, which is the fixed point of Y t+1 = ψ(Y t |F min ), where F min is the Dirac mass on a single sector. Nevertheless, this upper bound for steady states would mean thatã t (J) = 1 andã t (j) = 0 for every j < J. This is not compatible with Assumptions 2 and 5. Hence, the upper bound is not reachable under Assumptions 2 and 5. The model sheds light on the differences in timing in the transition rather than on the differences in steady state output levels. Note that the closer the economy to the upper bound steady state level of income, the more negligible the gain from an approval, although the approval itself is more likely.
In the case where the government proposes not only growth-enhancing changes, but also growth-reducing ones, the economy would fluctuate among different development paths through time. It would alternate growth with recession depending both on whether the proposal in the previous period was growth-enhancing and on whether such a proposal was approved. If the economy at a certain time t is considerably diversified, then in the following periods the economy is likely to iterate a similar distribution. This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, the economy is unlikely to approve proposals towards more concentration and, on the other hand, the economy cannot diversify much more than what it has already done. The same occurs if the economy at time t is specialized. Hence, if the government proposes randomly both growth-enhancing and growth-reducing distributions, then the economy fluctuates across time but tends to degenerate in the long run to either perfect diversification or perfect concentration, being the two scenarios the product of both chance and the initial distribution.
Our model basically suggests that the level of total output at a certain point in time is a product of the starting value of output and of the history of political blockages and approvals of an economy, which is a function of the initial public expenditure distribution. Given the initial degree of sectoral diversification of an economy, the status quo is broken and the economy shifts to higher development paths only if the government manages to formulate a proposal that is both growth-enhancing through the public investment and capable of collecting the sufficient political support through the redistribution of transfers. Moreover, if an economy is stuck into a development path characterized by a persistent public expenditure distribution, any event that modifies the initial distribution of vested interests, such as an economic crisis, the discovery of a natural resource, or an institutional change, may remove the political blockage and let the economy shift to different development paths. For example, suppose implementing a decentralization of political, fiscal, and administrative authority from the national to the regional level. This would create subnational economies out of an overall national econ-omy, where each of the regions would have its own tax system and public expenditure distribution. For simplification suppose that the population cannot migrate across regions. If the productive sectors were concentrated into geographic clusters due to agglomeration externalities and common local facilities, then, the regional economies would appear more specialized than the national economy. Hence, the conflicts of interests within each region would be less intense, and therefore the likelihood of political blockages would be lower. Thus, the blockage that might have occurred at the national level does not occur at the regional level, and each region would start to follow its own development path. This blockage removal is due to the fact that the decentralization of political, fiscal, and administrative authority generates the possibility of different political majorities across regions, and therefore each regional government is more likely to formulate politically implementable proposals. Here we are obviously neglecting all the possibly negative effects of decentralization such as tax competition, scale effects, and rent-seeking behavior of local monopolies.
Conclusion
The misallocation of resources between productive sectors explains a relevant part of TFP differences across countries. Since there are allocations that are efficient and others that are not, a natural question is why such differences across countries exist and tend to persist over time. We provide an explanation for this persistence. The basic idea is that the sectoral composition of an economy mirrors the distribution of vested interests across sectors. Hence, the distribution of public resources tends to mimic the distribution of value added, as we document in the data. Drastic changes in the distribution of public resources that might be growth-enhancing are therefore politically unfeasible and the sectoral composition is slacker to change than what would be optimal for growth. This generates cross-country differences in the pace of the path towards the optimal allocation of resources, where the differences are due to the initial sectoral composition of an economy.
We presented a general equilibrium model of growth able to generate the expected structural relations. The production side is characterized by a variety of sectors, each of them contributing to the production of the final goodà la Dixit and Stiglitz. The equilibrium solution leads to a law of motion for total output that depends on the public expenditure distribution across sectors. Under a restriction on the parameter space, an increase in dominance shifts the economy to a superior development path, due to the migration of the population towards highly productive sectors. We endogenize the public expenditure distribution as we make it the outcome of a voting process on new distributions proposed by the government. Due to a transfers scheme, individuals hold vested interests in the share within the government budget of the sector where they work. Hence, they vote in favor of proposals that increase their sector's share. Proposals can be either approved or blocked, depending on whether the mass of population supporting the proposal is greater than the mass of population opposing it. Thus, the likelihood of a political blockage depends on the population distribution each period, where the higher the initial dominance, the lower the possibility of a blockage. This implies that the level of development of an economy is a product of the history of political blockages and approvals, whose likelihood depends on the initial sectoral composition of the economy.
There exists an empirically relevant positive correlation between the timeinvariance of the public expenditure distribution and economic development. In our model, if the sectors are substitutable enough in the production of the final good, the government tends to propose more even public expenditure distributions across sectors to enhance growth. Hence, our model provides an explanation for why more developed economies are usually both more diversified and more time-invariant in the allocation of public expenditure across sectors. This explanation is alternative though overlapping to more widespread conjectures present in the literature, such as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [1] , where institutions play a key role.
The conflict of interests among sectors may be interpreted as the relationship between different types of producers as filtered by a political structure. Galor and Moav advocated in [13] such a model in particular to explain crosscountry differences in the timing of economic transition. The culprit of the difference in timing is the different complexity degrees of individual vested interests and a political structure that shows a "one size fits all" problem, paving the way for the conflicts of interests among producers that cause the separation between implementable and optimal public decisions.
The present work could be extended in several ways, both theoretically and empirically. On the theoretical side, more sophisticated political games could be taken into account for the existence of empirically relevant phenomena such as lobbies, small and highly motivated interest groups, incumbent biases, and so on. 20 Moreover, we could allow for a non-degenerate ergodic public expenditure distribution to arise in the long run, as the empirical evidence suggests. The long-run Gini index of the value added and public expenditure distributions would mirror the fundamental complementarity among industrial sectors of each economy. In the present version, the model only accounts for transitional dynamics, while the long run steady state is common to all economies that share the same parameter restrictions. A natural extension of our model to accommodate this need would be to make the complementarity among sectors depend negatively on the dimension of the economy. On the empirical side, the raw evidence presented here should be supported by a more thorough econometric exercise on the relationship between sectoral diversification, development, and the public expenditure distribution. This includes for instance a simultaneous equations model of panel estimation as sketched in Section 2, a decomposition of public expenditure into its subcomponents, and the analysis of different measures of sectoral diversification in terms of employment and sector-specific total factor productivity. Future work could also focus on a broader sample that would represent, on the one hand, a wider cross-country spectrum of development stages, and, on the other hand, longer time series where the phenomena we deal with would arise more clearly. However, any estimation exercise would suffer from the several dimensions of endogeneity in the target variables. Moreover, the overlapping generations and the perfect depreciation of our model's set-up, along with other simplifications, are not suitable for calibration exercises. Hence, the reformulation of the results allowing for infinitely lived heterogeneous agents and partial depreciation of both physical and human capital would quantitatively enrich the dynamics of the model and permit to empirically isolate the relations between sectoral diversification, public expenditure distribution, and development stage. that is, total income is equal to total output. With this result, we deduce from (15) and (10) Hence, the level of physical capital in the next period is, according to (13) ,
If we substitute for (14) in (6), then
If we consider that dA t (j) =ã t (j)dj and substituting for x =ã t (j) and F t (ã t (j)) = A t (j), we obtain (18). Let us consider again H t+1 . If we substitute for h t+1 (j) = A ǫ tã t (j) ǫ h(1), we obtain H t+1 = (A t ) ǫ h(1) 
If we substitute the equilibrium levels of physical and human capital, (23) and (24), inside next period's production function, we obtain
, which leads to (17) after rearranging the components. From (15) we know that ξ t+1 (j) = e t+1 (j)
which, by (18) and sinceã t+1 (j) =ẽ t+1 (j), yields (19) .
Proof of Proposition 2.
Since α ∈ (0, 1) and ǫ ∈ (0, 1), ǫ(1 − α) + α ∈ (0, 1). On the one hand, the first order derivative of ψ is always strictly positive and tends to 0 if Y t goes to infinity, and to infinity as Y t approaches 0. On the other hand, the second order derivative is always negative. Moreover, ψ(Y t |F 0 ) ≥ 0 for every Y t and ψ(0|F 0 ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. According to (21) , φ(F t ) = u(x)dF t (x). In particular, this holds for u = g, as long as g is nondecreasing under Assumption 3. Hence, g t (x)dF t (x). We can interpret φ as decreasing in F t , that is, every increase in dominance leads to a higher value of φ. According to (17) , if φ(F ′ t ) ≥ φ(F t ), then ψ t (Y t |F ′ t ) ≥ ψ t (Y t |F t ), i.e., an increase in dominance causes a higher future output. If Assumption 4 holds and F ′ t strictly dominates F t , then Proof of Proposition 5. From (19) and (17),
Hence, individual transfers are proportional toã t+1 (j), where the proportion is given only by period t's variables and the exogenous tax rate τ E t+1 . SinceF t+1 would only affectã t+1 (j), the comparison between ξ t+1 (j)|F t+1 and ξ t+1 (j)| Ft is the same as the comparison betweenã t+1 (j)|F t+1 andã t+1 (j)| Ft = a t (j). Thus, ξ t+1 (j)|F t+1 < ξ t+1 (j)| Ft if and only ifã t+1 (j)|F t+1 <ã t (j). Hence, A t+1 (j) < A t (j) for every j in (0, J). By Assumption 5, A t+1 (0) = A t (0), and A t+1 (J) = A t (J) by construction. Thus, by Rolle's theorem, there exists a sector j n in [0, J] such that the local derivatives of A t+1 (j) and A t (j) are the same, that is,
Proof of Proposition 7. According to Proposition 6, there exists at least one neutral sector. Let us define δ(j) ≡ A t (j) − A t+1 (j). Since F t+1 =F t+1 and as we proved in Proposition 6 A t+1 (j) < A t (j) for every j in (0, J), then δ(j) > 0 for every j in (0, J). Moreover, δ(0) = δ(J) = 0 by construction. The values of j in [0, J] for which δ(j) is maximal are given by the first order condition δ ′ (j) = 0, that is, A ′ t (j) − A ′ t+1 (j) =ã t (j) −ã t+1 (j) = 0. In other words, the δ(j) is maximal when j = j n , since by definitionã t (j n ) =ã t+1 (j n ).
If A ′′ t+1 (j) > A ′′ t (j) for every j in (0, J), then δ ′′ (j) < 0 for every j in (0, J). Hence, there exists a unique j n in (0, J) satisfyingã t+1 (j n ) =ã t (j n ). If j < j n , then δ ′ (j) < 0, that is,ã t+1 (j) <ã t (j). Otherwise if j > j n , theñ a t+1 (j) >ã t (j). 
APPENDIX B: Simulation of Blockages

